Williams v Spautz [1992] HCA 34; (1992) 174 CLR 509

Williams v Spautz [1992] HCA 34 – Detailed Summary

1. Case Header

Case Name: Williams and Others v Spautz

Citation: Williams v Spautz [1992] HCA 34; (1992) 174 CLR 509

Court: High Court of Australia

Date: 27 July 1992

Judges: Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron & McHugh JJ

Procedural Posture: Appeal to the High Court of Australia from orders of the Court of Appeal of New South Wales, which had set aside permanent stays granted by Smart J in the Supreme Court of New South Wales on the ground that certain prosecutions were an abuse of process.

2. Facts

2.1 Procedural Background

Dr Spautz was formerly a senior lecturer in the Department of Commerce at the University of Newcastle.

Following his dismissal, Dr Spautz commenced proceedings in the Equity Division of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in August 1980 seeking a declaration that his dismissal was invalid. Those proceedings had not been concluded at the time of the High Court appeal.

From 11 August 1981 onward, Dr Spautz commenced over thirty proceedings, the majority being criminal prosecutions, against persons connected with the University or involved in the events leading to his dismissal.

The criminal informations laid by Dr Spautz alleged offences including criminal defamation, conspiracy to seriously injure, conspiracy falsely to accuse, attempting to pervert the course of justice, and unlawful conspiracy.

The appeal before the High Court concerned only certain informations laid against:

Professor Williams
Mr Morris
Mr L. Gibbs (deceased)

The appellants commenced separate proceedings seeking declarations that the prosecutions were an abuse of process. Those matters came before Smart J (Supreme Court of New South Wales), who on 17 June 1988 granted declarations and permanently stayed the prosecutions.

Dr Spautz appealed. The Court of Appeal (Priestley and Meagher JJA; Mahoney JA dissenting) allowed the appeal and set aside Smart Js declarations and stays.

The appellants then appealed to the High Court of Australia against the Court of Appeals decision.

The High Court also noted that earlier prosecutions brought by Dr Spautz had been permanently stayed:

Hunt J dismissed certain prosecutions and permanently stayed them as an abuse of process in Spautz v Williams (1983) 2 NSWLR 506.
Yeldham J later made similar orders and additionally declared Dr Spautz a vexatious litigant under s 84(2) Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), restraining him from laying further informations against certain University members without leave.

2.2 Material Facts

(i) University dispute and dismissal

From 1973 to 1980, Dr Spautz was a senior lecturer in the Department of Commerce at the University of Newcastle. In 1977, Professor Williams was appointed to the Chair of Commerce at the University.

By the end of 1978 and throughout 1979, Dr Spautz was in serious conflict with Professor Williams, including:

allegations of plagiarism in Professor Williams doctoral thesis,
dispute over Professor Williams appointment to an administrative post,
threats of litigation.

The dispute reached the University Council, and a committee chaired by Professor Michael Carter was appointed to report and attempt to resolve it.

Following the committees recommendation, the University Council directed Dr Spautz to stop his campaign against Professor Williams and warned that disobedience would be treated as misconduct under the relevant University by-law.

A further committee chaired by the Deputy Chancellor, Mr Justice Kirby, was appointed to investigate Dr Spautz conduct, including whether he had disobeyed the Councils direction.

After the committee reported (finding in favour of Professor Williams on a number of issues), the University Council resolved on 20 May 1980 to dismiss Dr Spautz effective 23 May, unless he resigned earlier. Dr Spautz did not resign and the dismissal took effect.

(ii) Criminal informations relevant to this appeal

The High Court identified three informations relevant to the appeal:

13 July 1984: Dr Spautz laid an information against Professor Williams, charging several counts of unspecified criminal defamation on and after 1 November 1978.
26 September 1984: Dr Spautz laid an information against Mr Morris, charging a conspiracy with Mr Justice Kirby and other University members seriously to injure Dr Spautz without justification and by illegal means.
18 March 1985: Dr Spautz laid an information against Mr Gibbs, charging criminal defamation and conspiracy with Mr Justice Kirby, Professor Dutton and Mr Oliver criminally to defame.

(iii) Findings about Dr Spautz predominant purpose

Smart J found that the predominant purpose of Dr Spautz in instituting and maintaining the relevant criminal proceedings was to exert pressure on the University to reinstate him andor agree to a favourable settlement of his wrongful dismissal case.

The trial judges conclusion was supported by extensive documentation written and distributed by Dr Spautz, including newsletters, pamphlets, and memoranda sent to University members, media, politicians, and legal advisers. The materials contained:

warnings about proposed legal proceedings,
demands for reinstatement,
discussions of purpose and motive,
threats.

Smart J considered that the materials showed that Dr Spautz intended to exert pressure so that the University would settle the wrongful dismissal action on favourable terms, including reinstatement.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal rejected a challenge to the central finding concerning Dr Spautz predominant purpose.

Smart J also found Dr Spautz had other purposes in instituting proceedings, including:

collecting material for claimed research into corrupt practices in Australian institutions, and
vindication of his reputation.

However, those purposes did not detract from the finding that securing reinstatement was the dominant and improper purpose.

3. Issues

The High Court addressed the following legal issues, as framed and resolved by its reasoning:

3.1 Whether the criminal proceedings instituted and maintained by Dr Spautz constituted an abuse of process on the basis that they were brought for a purpose other than that for which such proceedings exist, including to obtain a collateral advantage or exert pressure to achieve an object outside the scope of the process.

3.2 Whether the criterion for abuse of process in such a case depends on the informants predominant purpose, rather than requiring proof that the improper purpose was the sole purpose of instituting the proceedings.

3.3 Whether the Court of Appeal erred in holding that a permanent stay should not be granted in the absence of some improper act in the prosecution of the process.

3.4 Whether the Court of Appeal erred in treating the supervisory jurisdiction to stay proceedings for abuse of process as confined to cases where intervention is the only way of ensuring a fair trial.

4. Rule

4.1 Abuse of process improper purpose collateral advantage

The High Court affirmed that court proceedings may not be used or threatened:

for the purpose of obtaining some collateral advantage, and
not for the purpose for which such proceedings are properly designed and exist,

and that a party who does so may be held guilty of abusing the process of the court and disqualified from invoking the powers of the court by proceedings he has abused.

The trial judges formulation (based on Hunt J in Spautz v Williams) identified abuse of process as arising where proceedings are instituted andor maintained:

for a purpose other than that for which they exist, or
to achieve a collateral advantage beyond that which the law offers, or
to exert pressure to effect an object not within the scope of the process,

with the focus being on the dominant purpose of the person instituting the proceedings.

4.2 Predominant purpose as the criterion

The High Court held that the criterion is predominant purpose, not sole purpose.

The Court noted that while it had been suggested in earlier authority that abuse might require the improper purpose to be the sole purpose, in more recent times it has been said, in our view correctly, that the predominant purpose is the criterion.

Authorities applied in support of the predominant purpose criterion included:

Goldsmith v Sperrings Ltd (1977) 1 WLR 478 (Lord Denning MR)
Metall and Rohstoff v Donaldson Inc (1990) 1 QB 391 (Slade LJ) stating that the person alleging abuse must show that the predominant purpose of using legal process was one other than that for which it was designed.

4.3 Abuse of process jurisdiction distinct from fair trial control

Brennan J emphasised that:

the jurisdiction to prevent an abuse of process, and
the power to mould procedures to ensure a fair trial,

are distinct aspects of curial authority.

His Honour distinguished Jago v District Court (NSW) as dealing with the courts procedures to ensure a fair trial, whereas this case concerned the abuse of process aspect of curial authority.

4.4 Meaning of abuse of process (criminal process used for an alien purpose)

Brennan J stated (by reference to his reasons in Jago(62) (1989) 168 CLR) that:

“An abuse of process occurs when the process of the court is put in motion for a purpose which, in the eye of the law, it is not intended to serve…”, and that the unfairness against which a litigant is entitled to protection is subjection to process not intended (or not capable) to serve its true purpose.

In the present case, the appellants sought protection on the basis that the criminal proceedings were commenced and maintained for a purpose alien to the purpose which such proceedings are intended to serve.

4.5 No improper act after issue requirement (supervisory abuse of process)

The High Court rejected the Court of Appeals view that relief for abuse of process depends upon the identification of some improper act in the conduct of proceedings after they have been instituted.

Where proceedings are instituted and maintained for an improper purpose, the abuse lies in the misuse of the courts process itself, and does not require proof of additional improper conduct in the prosecution of the proceedings.

5. Application

The High Court applied the abuse of process principles by:

Identifying the nature and scope of the stay jurisdiction;
distinguishing unfair trial cases from improper purpose cases; and
determining whether the respondents prosecutions were instituted and maintained for an improper purpose, such that they constituted an abuse of process warranting a permanent stay.

5.1 Characterisation of the dispute before the High Court

The High Court noted that the appeal concerned orders of the Court of Appeal of New South Wales which had set aside orders made by Smart J permanently staying certain prosecutions instituted by Dr Spautz on the ground of abuse of process.

The Court observed that only some of the issues that confronted Smart J were before the High Court, but that it was necessary to set out the complex factual and procedural background.

The appeal concerned particular informations laid by Dr Spautz against Professor Williams, Mr Morris and Mr Gibbs.

5.2 The trial judges approach: dominant purpose and improper use of criminal process

The High Court described Smart Js adoption of the formulation (drawn from Hunt J in Spautz v Williams) that proceedings may constitute an abuse of process where they are instituted andor maintained:

for a purpose other than that for which they exist,
to achieve a collateral advantage beyond that which the law offers, or
to exert pressure to effect an object not within the scope of the process,
with the focus being on the dominant purpose of the person instituting them.

Smart J concluded that the fundamental purposes of a criminal defamation prosecution are to punish the defamer and protect the community, and that the dominant purpose of the prosecutor must be to bring the offender to justice.

Because Dr Spautzs predominant purpose in bringing the prosecutions was to secure reinstatement, Smart J declared each of the relevant proceedings an abuse of process and permanently stayed them.

5.3 The Court of Appeals approach and its effect on the outcome

The High Court noted that the majority in the Court of Appeal accepted that proceedings instituted for an improper purpose were capable of constituting an abuse of process, but held that a permanent stay should not be granted in the absence of some improper act in the conduct of the proceedings after they had been instituted.

The Court of Appeal further treated the supervisory jurisdiction to stay proceedings for abuse of process as confined to cases where intervention was necessary to prevent an unfair trial, relying in particular on Jago v District Court (NSW).

On that basis, the Court of Appeal concluded that, as the appellants were not shown to be at risk of an unfair trial, the permanent stays granted by Smart J should be set aside.

5.4 The High Courts analysis: the dual purposes of the stay jurisdiction

The High Court reaffirmed that superior courts have inherent power to stay proceedings which are an abuse of process.

The Court stated that the jurisdiction to grant a stay of a criminal prosecution has a dual purpose:

to prevent an abuse of process, or
to prevent the prosecution of a criminal proceeding which will result in an unfair trial.

The Court emphasised that abuse of process has been used to describe both:

the case where prosecution is brought for an improper purpose, and
the case where prosecution is conducted so as to make it an instrument of oppression resulting in an unfair trial.

5.5 Distinguishing unfair trial cases from improper purpose cases

The High Court explained that where a permanent stay is sought to prevent an unfair trial, the court will not grant a stay unless satisfied that an unfair trial will ensue unless the prosecution is stayed, and that there are no other available means (such as directions by the trial judge) to bring about a fair trial.

The Court noted that Jago was such a case, and that the judgments in Jago therefore emphasised the necessity of that satisfaction before granting relief.

By contrast, where a stay is sought to stop a prosecution instituted and maintained for an improper purpose, the Court stated that it does not follow that it is necessary, before granting a stay, for the court to satisfy itself that an unfair trial will ensue unless the prosecution is stopped.

The Court recognised policy considerations that support requiring such satisfaction, including:

the importance of courts exercising their jurisdiction to try persons charged with criminal offences unless the interests of justice demand otherwise,
the importance of preserving freedom of access to courts, and
the risk that defendants might seek stays on flimsy grounds for tactical reasons.

However, the Court held that those considerations did not outweigh countervailing policy considerations and did not justify deterring courts from exercising the jurisdiction in appropriate circumstances.

5.6 The policy basis for intervention in improper purpose cases

The High Court stated that every court is in duty bound to protect itself against an abuse of its process.

It identified two fundamental policy considerations in dealing with abuse of process in criminal proceedings:

the public interest requires courts to protect their ability to function by ensuring their processes are used fairly by State and citizen alike; and
failure to do so would erode public confidence because of concern that the courts processes may lend themselves to oppression and injustice.

5.7 Application to the respondents prosecutions: improper purpose and reinstatement objective

The High Court treated the central question as whether the prosecutions were instituted andor maintained for a purpose other than that for which they were properly designed or exist, including to obtain a collateral advantage or exert pressure to achieve an object outside the scope of the process.

The Court noted Smart Js conclusion that Dr Spautzs predominant purpose in bringing the prosecutions was to secure reinstatement, and that this purpose was improper and ulterior.

The High Court therefore accepted that the prosecutions were characterised by the trial judge as being brought for a purpose inconsistent with the proper purposes of criminal process.

5.8 Rejection of the Court of Appeals limiting approach

The High Court rejected the Court of Appeals view that relief for abuse of process should not be granted in the absence of an improper act in the prosecution of the process.

The High Court also rejected the Court of Appeals view that supervisory courts should restrict the abuse of process power to cases where intervention is the only way of ensuring a fair trial.

The Court treated the appellants submission as correct: that a permanent stay may be granted where proceedings have been commenced and maintained for an improper purpose, even if the defendant may obtain a fair trial.

6. Conclusion

The High Court allowed the appeal from the Court of Appeal of New South Wales.

The High Court held that the proceedings instituted by Dr Spautz against the appellants constituted an abuse of process, and that the permanent stays granted by Smart J should stand.

The High Court rejected the approach taken by the majority in the Court of Appeal that a permanent stay should not be granted in the absence of an improper act in the prosecution of the process, and rejected the view that the stay power should be confined to cases where it is the only way to ensure a fair trial.

7. Precedent / Legal Principles

The High Court affirmed and clarified the following principles:

7.1 Inherent power to stay proceedings for abuse of process

Superior courts have inherent power to stay proceedings which are an abuse of process.

7.2 Dual purposes of the stay jurisdiction

The jurisdiction to grant a stay of a criminal prosecution has a dual purpose:

to prevent an abuse of process; and
to prevent the prosecution of a criminal proceeding which will result in an unfair trial.

7.3 Abuse of process includes prosecutions brought for an improper purpose

Abuse of process includes the traditional case where a prosecution is brought for an improper purpose, and also extends to prosecutions conducted as instruments of oppression resulting in unfair trial.

7.4 Improper purpose stays are not confined to fair trial necessity

Where a stay is sought to stop a prosecution instituted and maintained for an improper purpose, it does not follow that the court must be satisfied that an unfair trial will ensue unless the prosecution is stopped.

7.5 Courts must protect their own processes

Courts are duty bound to protect themselves against abuse of process.

7.6 Public confidence and protection against oppression

In criminal proceedings, two fundamental policy considerations support intervention:

the public interest requires courts to ensure their processes are used fairly by State and citizen alike; and
failure to do so risks erosion of public confidence due to concern that court processes may lend themselves to oppression and injustice.

7.7 Focus on dominant predominant purpose

Where proceedings are instituted andor maintained for a purpose other than that for which they are properly designed or exist, including to achieve a collateral advantage or exert pressure to achieve an object outside the scope of the process, the focus is on:

the purpose for which the proceedings exist, and
the dominant purpose of the person instituting them.

8. Ratio Decidendi

Where a criminal prosecution is instituted and maintained for an improper collateral purpose, and the predominant purpose of the prosecutor is to obtain an advantage outside the proper scope of the criminal process (such as exerting pressure to secure reinstatement or a favourable civil settlement), the prosecution constitutes an abuse of process and may be permanently stayed, even if a fair trial would otherwise be possible.