Walton v Gardiner [1993] HCA 77; (1993) 177 CLR 378; (1993) 112 ALR 289; (1993) 67 ALJR 485

Walton v Gardiner [1993] HCA 77 – Concise Summary

1. Case Header

Court: High Court of Australia

Date: 29 April 1993

Judges: Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson, Toohey JJ

2. Background

Appeals from the New South Wales Court of Appeal, which had permanently stayed disciplinary proceedings before the Medical Tribunal on the ground of abuse of process.

3. Facts

Between approximately 1970 and 1978, the respondents, registered medical practitioners, were involved in the administration or supervision of “deep sleep therapy” and associated electro-convulsive therapy at Chelmsford Private Hospital.

Earlier disciplinary proceedings, based on treatment of named patients, were instituted in the mid-1980s and permanently stayed in 1986 due to extreme and unjustified delay causing prejudice to the practitioners.

Following a Royal Commission into Deep Sleep Therapy (1988–1990), new disciplinary complaints were instituted in 1991, framed more broadly but arising out of the same pattern of conduct.

By 1991, between 12 and 20 years had elapsed since the alleged conduct, and no respondent had practised or engaged in the alleged misconduct since 1979.

4. Issues

Issue 1 – Whether the New South Wales Court of Appeal had supervisory jurisdiction to stay proceedings before the Medical Tribunal on the ground of abuse of process.

Issue 2 – Whether that jurisdiction was confined to cases of impossibility of a fair hearing or improper purpose.

Issue 3 – Whether the extreme delay, prejudice to the respondents, and existence of earlier permanently stayed proceedings rendered continuation of the 1991 proceedings an abuse of process.

Issue 4 – Whether the Court of Appeal erred in treating considerations analogous to double jeopardy as relevant.

Issue 5 – Whether the Court of Appeal erred in ordering permanent stays of the Tribunal proceedings.

5. Rule

The Supreme Court of New South Wales possesses supervisory jurisdiction under s 23 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) to stay proceedings before inferior courts and tribunals where continuation would constitute an abuse of process.

That jurisdiction is not confined to cases where a fair hearing is impossible or proceedings are instituted for an improper purpose, but extends to proceedings that are “so unfairly and unjustifiably oppressive” as to undermine the administration of justice, as affirmed in Jago v District Court of New South Wales (1989) 168 CLR 23, Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509, and Hunter v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police [1982] AC 529.

Extreme and unjustified delay may itself ground an abuse of process where it results in oppression or serious unfairness, even if a fair hearing remains technically possible, applying Jago v District Court of New South Wales.

Whether proceedings should be stayed is determined by a weighing process, balancing fairness to the individual, the public interest, and the integrity of the justice system, adapted to the protective character of disciplinary proceedings, as recognised in Herron v McGregor (1986) 6 NSWLR 246 and endorsed in the present case.

6. Application

Issue 1 – JurisdictionThe Court of Appeal possessed supervisory jurisdiction under s 23 to stay Tribunal proceedings, a position settled by Herron v McGregor and not open to reopening.

Issue 2 – Scope of jurisdictionThe Court rejected the narrow view that a stay is available only where a fair hearing is impossible or proceedings are brought for an improper purpose.

Issue 3 – Delay and oppressionThe extreme delay, compounded by the passage of time since the 1986 stays, caused inevitable and serious prejudice to the respondents, rendering continuation of the proceedings unjustifiably oppressive.

Issue 4 – Prior proceedings and double jeopardy considerationsAlthough strict double jeopardy did not apply, the fairness considerations underlying the principle were relevant, given the prior permanent stays and substantial overlap in subject matter.

Issue 5 – Exercise of discretionThe Court of Appeal’s decision resulted from a proper weighing process and disclosed no error of law or principle warranting appellate intervention.

7. Conclusion

The appeals were dismissed.The permanent stays ordered by the New South Wales Court of Appeal remained in force.

8. Precedent / Legal Principles

The High Court affirmed that:

A superior court has supervisory jurisdiction to stay proceedings before inferior courts or tribunals where continuation would constitute an abuse of process.
Abuse of process is not confined to cases of improper purpose or impossibility of a fair hearing, but extends to proceedings that are so unfairly and unjustifiably oppressive as to undermine the administration of justice.
Extreme and unjustified delay may itself constitute an abuse of process where it results in serious unfairness or oppression.
Whether proceedings constitute an abuse of process requires a weighing process, balancing fairness to the individual, the public interest, and the integrity of the justice system.
Abuse of process principles apply to disciplinary proceedings notwithstanding their protective character, where the consequences for the individual are serious.
The existence of earlier proceedings permanently stayed as oppressive, based on substantially the same conduct, is a relevant consideration supporting a stay.
Although strict double jeopardy rules do not apply, the fairness considerations underlying the principle are relevant in assessing oppression.
An appellate court should not interfere with a discretionary decision to stay proceedings for abuse of process absent identifiable error of law or principle.

9. Ratio Decidendi

Where disciplinary proceedings are instituted after extreme and unjustified delay, following earlier proceedings based on substantially the same conduct that were permanently stayed as oppressive, and where continuation of the proceedings would be unfairly and unjustifiably oppressive notwithstanding the protective character of the jurisdiction, a superior court may permanently stay those proceedings as an abuse of process in order to protect the administration of justice.

A confession found by the trial judge to be voluntary and obtained without unfairness or prohibited treatment will be a upheld on appeal, and a conviction substantially dependent on such a confession is safe.